Wednesday, February 7, 2018

The Culture Club


All good things must come to an end, and often times the better the “good” was, the more distressing the end will be. Nowhere is this truer than in the world of sports, where our heroes inevitably age, their teams deteriorate, and their coaches and GMs get fired or decide that the idea of “rebuilding” is not exactly what they signed up for. This life cycle is an axiom in sports, which is why what the Dallas Mavericks are currently attempting to pull off is so unique - on the borderline of unprecedented.

When Rick Carlisle led the Mavericks to a title in the summer of 2011, he did so with the second-oldest championship roster in modern NBA history. The personnel decisions that followed were solely focused on landing a “big fish” free agent to pair with an aging Dirk Nowitzki, a path that proved to be fruitless. The resulting rosters resembled what my colleague Bob Sturm termed “a pack of basketball cards strewn about the floor with all of the star players removed," save for Dirk. Indeed, from 2012-13 through the training camp of 2016, the Mavericks were among the league leaders in roster turnover.


Season% MIN BY RET PLYRSLG RANK
2012-1339%28
2013-1448%25
2014-1538%29
2015-1655%24

For reference, here's the how the rest of the league stacked up during that time, per Basketball Reference.



The shade designated to the Mavericks on this chart evokes the same sentiment that their offseasons did in this period: barren and dry, no sustainable life or growth.

Yet from 2012-13 to 2015-16, Carlisle coached Dirk and the Cards You Threw Away to the 12th highest regular season winning percentage and three postseason berths in four years. They culminated in first round exits, sure. But it was clear that the organization had decided that they would fight like hell every season to continue to make the playoffs while Dirk was in town, and at the same time take big swings in the offseason. This produced overachieving for mediocrity, and at the same time created a grim reality for Dallas: they were nowhere near contending, and nowhere near developing a new young core.

It should be stressed that this was a decision made not only by Carlisle, but Mark Cuban, Donnie Nelson, Jr., and yes, Nowitzki. He made it known he was not interested in playing with “a bunch of rookies.” So the Mavs drafted very low, and played the players they did acquire so little they couldn’t really find their sea legs.

Dallas has a reputation as a team that can’t draft, or can’t develop, or both. To a certain extent, we accept results are what they are. However, I would argue that some of this has been circumstantial, and a result in this decision to remain competitive.

From 1997-2016, Dallas had the second-lowest average draft position, at 38.5. Last season, the Mavericks' 15-man roster had an average draft position of 43.93, the lowest in the league. It’s easy to point to the Spurs and decry the Mavs' failures in this area. The reality, though, is a franchise judging itself only against one of the greatest runs in sports history is going to be steadily disappointed. San Antonio has done a singular job of taking players late in the draft and nurturing them along, all the while still having a roster loaded with stars that can make deep playoff runs.

The outcome of this strategy in the post-title era has been Monta Ellis and Shawn Marion over Shane Larkin and Jae Crowder. Rajon Rondo acquired for Crowder and a first-round pick. Al-Farouq Aminu struggling to get minutes. David Lee playing over Dwight Powell. Justin Anderson averaging 12 minutes a night in his time as a Maverick.

Certainly the point is not to say that this particular collection of players was the key to the Mavericks future. Some of them have shown improvement in other cities, some haven’t. But the point is that the Mavericks have largely picked in the portion of the draft where it’s very difficult to find impact talent (for everyone but the Spurs), and then favored veteran minutes in the name of giving Dirk the best chance to make the playoffs.

Does this mean Rick Carlisle hates the idea of playing young players? Or does it really mean that Rick Carlisle is not interested in giving minutes to players taken late in the draft while trying to make the playoffs? Does the fact that Carlisle couldn’t develop Ricky Ledo or Justin Anderson while somehow getting a team to 45ish wins really mean you don’t want him coaching Dennis Smith Jr. and Deandre Ayton together? That’s as foolish as it sounds.

The last 20 months have provided a stark change for anyone paying attention. After winning 42 games in 2015-16 and being summarily shown their postseason exit, the Mavericks faced the music. The allocation of minutes changed.


SeasonMIN BY PLYRS 26 & UNDER
2015-161,832
2016-1711,064
2017-1810,714 (on pace)


That's a dramatic increase for any team. Despite having played in just 50 games over three journeyman seasons, Steph Curry played 29 minutes a night in 70 games. Rookie Yogi Ferrell clocked in with 29 a night as well. 24-year old Harrison Barnes took on a heavy load, attempting to take his game to the next level in an expanded role. The Mavericks lost 49 games, their worst season since Cuban bought the club. But it was clear they knew what needed to be done, and were now doing it.

The directive was perhaps never clearer than on draft night, when the Mavericks got their wish and selected 19-year-old point guard Dennis Smith Jr. out of North Carolina State with the 9thpick. On draft night, Carlisle surprised many by saying “I would project him as a starter, but he will have to earn it,” Carlisle said. That statement is a recognition of two things:

1) This kid is not Shane Larkin, and

2) Rick knows the time to shepherd the next generation of Mavericks has arrived. It's not exactly the sort of decision and language that would be espoused by a stodgy stalwart not amenable to adaptation.

When the organization decided its focus was development, it appears clear Carlisle was perfectly fine buying in. Yes, he will still ride his players hard, and at times he’ll still sound like that professor who cannot believe he has to explain this 101 material.

But lost in the debate over “will Rick be good with the kids” and “will Rick even want to deal with the kids” is that coaches are competitors. Competitors like challenges. What the Mavericks are attempting to do is exceptionally rare in sports. A coach takes his team to the mountaintop, endures a time of uncertainty, regroups all the way down at base camp, and then starts the trudge back up. Leading them through it all.

There are a million unforeseen things that could throw this plan off track. Cuban could sell the team, Carlisle could decide for any number of reasons basketball-related or otherwise that he’d rather do something else at this point of his life, etc. What seems clear to me, though, is that the Mavericks organization, collectively, have signaled that they are betting on stability and culture in an otherwise volatile industry.

(At this point, I think I should stop and stress that I am referring to Mavericks basketball culture. I do not wish to make light of the recent reports detailing the workplace environment on the business side of the Mavericks operations. Everyone can make their own judgements about what Mark Cuban did or didn't know regarding those accounts. I, for one, find it impossible that he had not at least heard whispers about the behavior of former CEO Terdema Ussery. I also disagree with his logic for keeping former Mavs.com writer Earl K. Sneed employed after a second domestic violence incident. However, I don't believe that the toxic culture on the business side of the building negates decades of positive culture built up on the basketball side. In fact, the SI report quotes one former female staffer thusly: “I dealt with players all the time. I had hundreds of interactions with players and never once had an issue…they always knew how to treat people. Then I'd go to the office and it was this zoo, this complete shitshow. My anxiety would go down dealing with players; it would go up when I got to my desk.” For years, incoming veterans have lauded the culture of the Mavericks as a basketball team, and I want to be clear that when referring to the culture of the team and how it relates to their future, this is what I'm referring to. OK, back to hoops.)

If Carlisle wanted no part of this, wouldn’t he have jumped ship two years ago? He certainly had options, as I’m sure he does today. This man fought through coaching a team that lost 60% of their games last season, and will probably lose more this year. Doesn’t it stand to reason to think he’ll want to be in Dallas on the other side of this? It seems clear the front office wants him here, and plans to be patient.

Of course, there are no guarantees that this plan pans out, even if Carlisle is fully on board. The road will be bumpy and heads will butt. Even this season, there have been nights when Smith Jr. hasn't been on the floor in crunch times, and fans have questioned the logic. The reality is, DSJ has played more minutes than any rookie PG not named Ben Simmons.

In a recent road game against the Clippers, Dallas held a 10 point lead with under five minutes to play. Carlisle opted for a lineup with two rookies, two second-year players, and Wesley Matthews. The Mavs coughed up the lead and lost.

 "I decided to play the young guys down the stretch to get them the experience of closing the game -- and they learned a few things."

The Dallas Mavericks are squarely in the ashes of this new life cycle. What seems much clearer now is that if the Mavericks do rise from this, it will be with Rick Carlisle on the bench. And that’s a good thing for the city of Dallas.

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